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INTRODUCTION 
When Hugo Zacchini shot himself out of a cannon, the television sta-
tion which broadcasted the performer‘s entire fifteen second cannonball 
performance without permission was held to have violated the performer‘s 
right to publicity.1  Despite the station‘s claim that its broadcast was pro-
tected as a newsworthy event under the First Amendment, the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled that broadcast of the act effectively deprived the perfor-
mer of the act‘s commercial value and constituted unjust enrichment on 
behalf of the station by receiving for free what others had paid to view.2  
Baseball players‘ right to publicity in the value of their photograph prec-
luded Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. from including trading cards in its chew-
ing gum packets without compensation and permission of the players.3  
Other athletes have also restricted the commercial use of their name, image, 
or distinctive references by third parties without authorization.  In the 
sports and entertainment arenas, violations of publicity rights have been ad-
judged in a number of settings, including the use of the name of a profes-
sional hockey player as a character in a comic book,4 the use of an athlete‘s 
recognized nickname in a shaving cream commercial,5 and even a drawing 
which contained distinctive characteristics resembling a popular athlete.6 
Athletes make tremendous investments in developing their competi-
tive skills, achievements, and reputations.  Sports teams and leagues are al-
 
 * Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  The Author would like to thank Ka-
therine Burris, law student at Pepperdine University School of Law, for outstanding research assistance, 
and Chapman School of Law and the Chapman Law Review for their support and hosting of the Sym-
posium on Publicity Rights in Bytes, at which an early version of this paper was presented. 
 1 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (recognizing that the right 
of publicity protects the proprietary interest of an ―individual to ‗reap the reward of his endeavors.‘‖). 
 2 Id. at 578. 
 3 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir. 1953) (holding that 
New York‘s common law protected a baseball player‘s right in the publicity value of his photograph). 
 4 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 5 Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (finding that Elroy Hirsch 
possessed publicity rights in the ―Crazylegs‖ nickname). 
 6 Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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so in the business of promoting their sport/product and developing brand 
recognition, goodwill, and customer loyalty.  Granted, athletes may be 
compensated handsomely to play,7 and ticket sales and broadcasting reve-
nues may be lucrative.  But much of what athletes and sport leagues own is 
intangible, yet extremely valuable, and derives from the infrastructure of 
organized competition that generates an insatiable public interest in sports 
and the players themselves.  The proprietary value of an athlete‘s identity is 
evident by the endorsement opportunities he or she can procure.8  Intellec-
tual property rights, which encompass copyrights, trademarks, and rights of 
publicity, protect the rights of the owners, teams, leagues, and players to 
control and profit from their investments and the commercial use of their 
identity.  Yet, in a society which holds dear free speech, free enterprise, in-
novation, and, increasingly, free and instant access to online information, 
be it news, sports, or entertainment, the state of athletes‘ publicity rights is 
uncertain.  A debate ensues in determining the appropriate boundaries for 
players‘ publicity rights against the right of commerce and the interests of 
the public under the First Amendment. 
The right to publicity is defined as the ―inherent right of every human 
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.‖9  The recogni-
tion of an athlete or celebrity‘s right to publicity is justified by the right to 
control and protect one‘s image, reputation, and proprietary interests.  Tra-
ditionally, a company that intended to use the name or identity of an athlete 
or celebrity in a sports-themed product, advertisement, or commercial ser-
vice, obtained permission and acquired licensing rights to do so.  Thus, ent-
ities in the business of selling sports-related trading cards, apparel, board 
games, video games, and other commercial products that used player iden-
tities secured licenses from players to do so.10  However, when the union 
for Major League Baseball players decided to terminate licensing rights to 
player identities in fantasy baseball, the producers sought to use player 
names and statistics in online fantasy sports for free.  They won.11 
While the ―Human Cannonball‖ act remains impressive under any 
standard of technology, the variety of ways an athlete‘s performance, iden-
tity, or persona can be used has multiplied.  As new media continues to de-
 
 7 College athletes also may garner significant publicity, yet these athletes are restricted from 
capitalizing on individual rights of publicity due to restrictions set out in NCAA regulations.  See, e.g., 
Kristine Mueller, No Control Over Their Rights of Publicity: College Athletes Left Sitting the Bench, 2 
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 70 (2004); Bloom v. Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n, 93 
P.3d 621, 627 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 8 For some athletes, endorsement income exceeds the pay received for playing. 
 9 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY  § 1:3 (2d ed. 2007); Mil-
ler v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 10 See Matthew G. Massari, When Fantasy Meets Reality: The Clash Between On-line Fantasy 
Sports Providers and Intellectual Property Rights, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 443, 457 (2006); Julie A. 
Garcia, The Future of Sports Merchandise Licensing, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 219 (1995) (de-
scribing licensing processes in various sports leagues). 
 11 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 
818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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velop, the landscape of the sports industry also shifts.  In this age of instan-
taneous digital communication, Internet downloading, file sharing, and on-
line commerce, discerning what constitutes the public domain while cir-
cumscribing the right to publicity is increasingly complicated. 
Although ―[t]he one constant through all the years . . . has been base-
ball,‖12 much has changed since baseball‘s nineteenth century origins.  
What began simply enough as clubs coming together to give exhibitions of 
baseball13 is now a multi-million dollar industry where the average salary 
of participants is nearly $3 million, yearly revenue of teams exceed $100 
million, and the costs of stadiums and franchises are in the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars.14  Much of this revenue comes from broadcasting con-
tracts, licenses, and endorsements.15  The market for sports-related products 
and services continues to expand.  Others want to get in the game by en-
gaging in commercial enterprises that involve sports and player identities.  
While the hot dog vendor and neighborhood bar outside the baseball sta-
dium have long profited indirectly from the public‘s attention to organized 
games, the stakes and potential profits for outside enterprises to capitalize 
on the league brand are enormous.  The market for fantasy sports generates 
millions in revenue to its producers.16  The uses and potential abuses of 
sports intellectual property outside traditional jurisdictional boundaries are 
considerable.  Where does the right to publicity begin, end, and public 
rights to commercial use of the same emerge? 
This Comment examines the treatment of athlete publicity rights in the 
context of fantasy sports as well as new media uses.  Part I examines cases 
where athlete publicity rights have been recognized and rejected.  Part II 
focuses upon fantasy sports‘ challenge to player publicity rights in C.B.C. 
Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P.17  In C.B.C, both the federal district court and Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld, albeit for different reasons, the unlicensed use of player 
names and statistics by a fantasy sports provider in the online games that 
 
 12 FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Studios 1989); see also ESPN.com, Readers: Best Movie 
Quotes, available at http://espn.go.com/page2/s/list/readers/moviequotes/best.html (last visited Apr. 8, 
2008). 
 13 See Fed. Baseball v. Nat‘l League of Prof‘l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922). 
 14 Kurt Badenhausen et al, Baseball’s Big Bucks (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.forbes.com/ 
2007/04/19/baseball-team-valuations-07mlb-cz_kb_0419baseballintro.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) 
(noting that MLB‘s revenues totaled $5.1 billion in 2006).  Following the 2007 season, the New York 
Yankees had a value of $1.2 billion dollars.  This number includes stadium income and brand manage-
ment.  #1 New York Yankees, FORBES.COM, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/33/ 
07mlb_New-York-Yankees_334613.html [hereinafter Yankees]. 
 15 See, e.g., Yankees, supra note 14; Howard Bloom, Going Inside MLB’s Latest $3 Billion TV 
Agreements, SPORTS BUSINESS NEWS, July 13, 2006, www.sportsbusinessnews.com/_news/news_ 
347260.php. 
 16 See Brandon T. Moonier, Comment, The Legal Game Behind Fantasy Sports: Copyright Pro-
tection and the Right of Publicity in Professional Performance Statistics, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
129 (2007) (estimating that fantasy baseball users annual expenditures of $175 million and that fantasy 
baseball is a $1 billion industry). 
 17 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2008 
U.S. LEXIS 4574 (June 2, 2008). 
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CBC sells to the public.18  Part III analyzes the impact of C.B.C. on the fu-
ture of athlete publicity rights in the expanding commercial market for on-
line sports content, gaming, and media.  Part IV reflects upon the policy 
considerations underlying athletes‘ rights to control use of their names 
against what appears to be an overriding regard for free use based on public 
interest and proposes explicit legislative and judicial articulation of such. 
I.  THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY VERSUS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
OF FAIR USE 
A. The Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is among a group of laws of intellectual property 
addressing unfair competition.19  The right is based in state law and, to 
date, recognized in over half the states by common law or statute.20  The 
right of publicity developed judicially as one aspect of the right of privacy, 
defined as an appropriation of one‘s name or likeness.21  The rights are dis-
tinct, however, in that the right of privacy implies a right to be left alone.  
In contrast, the publicity right capitalizes on the spotlight but asserts a 
property right in that fame, which has commercial value that can be sold or 
licensed.22  The right recognizes the value in intangible assets, such as 
name, identity, brand, and goodwill or reputation, and the right to control 
the commercial uses of one‘s identity.23 
An action based on right to publicity, a state law claim, must generally 
establish (1) the validity of one‘s right of publicity; and (2) that this right 
has been infringed.24  Under Missouri law, for example, infringement is 
demonstrated by showing ―(1) [t]hat defendant used plaintiff‘s name as a 
symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and with the intent to obtain 
a commercial advantage.‖25  Other states have adopted a narrower test, 
modifying the commercial advantage element and requiring a plaintiff to 
prove that: ―(A) Defendant, without permission, has used some aspect of 
 
 18 See infra Section III. 
 19 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1:3. 
 20  See Joshua Nelson, State Right to Publicity Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, Jan. 20, 2006,  http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/publicity04.htm (identifying 
thirty states recognizing right of publicity by statutes or common law).  These states have adopted vary-
ing definitions and scopes of the right.  Thus, the judicial interpretations of how the right is defined are 
varied and, frankly, often convoluted.  See Richard T. Karcher, The Use of Player’s Identities in Fanta-
sy Sports Leagues: Developing Workable Standards for Right of Publicity Claims, 111 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 557, 558 (2007) (noting that, ―[i]n many states, the parameters or even the existence of the right of 
publicity remains [sic] undetermined.‖) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, 
cmt. b (2005)). 
 21 See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 22 Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Wis. 1979) (distinguishing right to 
be let alone from a right to be compensated for the use of one‘s name for commercial purposes). 
 23 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at §§ 5:63–5:67. 
 24 Id. at § 3:2. 
 25 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).  Missouri law was at is-
sue in CBC.  See infra Part II. 
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identity or persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable from defen-
dant‘s use; and (B) defendant‘s use is likely to cause damage to the com-
mercial value of that persona.‖26 
With respect to the essential element of identity, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that the defendant used some aspect of the plaintiff‘s identity or perso-
na in such a way that the plaintiff is identifiable.  It is important to recog-
nize that the test for infringement is ―identifiability‖ and not confusion as 
to endorsement by the person.27  Deception and false endorsement are sepa-
rate claims and not necessary for a publicity violation.  As Professor 
McCarthy notes: 
Identity can be stolen and used to attract attention to an advertisement or product 
without giving rise to a valid claim of false endorsement.  The identity of a fam-
ous person is used to cut through the clutter of advertising and to merely draw at-
tention to the advertisement.  It is common in advertising just to use the picture 
or name of a celebrity or a person prominent in a certain field without any hint of 
endorsement.28 
As a form of intellectual property, the right of publicity serves certain 
important economic interests.29  Among these interests are the encourage-
ment of creative activities and works, the preservation of the commercial 
value of goodwill, the prevention of unjust enrichment, dilution or exploita-
tion of such by others, as well as protecting against false suggestions of en-
dorsement or sponsorship.30 
B. Related But Distinct Claims 
One might reasonably question whether the right of publicity is neces-
sary as a distinct claim.31  The fact that just over half of the U.S. states rec-
ognize the right by statute or common law suggests that not all believe a 
separate right of publicity is needed.32  Other forms of intellectual property 
protect similar proprietary interests as the right of publicity, yet apply to 
distinct areas.  For example, the federal Copyright Act protects ―[o]riginal 
 
 26 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 3:2. 
 27 Some courts conflate the two, as the district court did in C.B.C.  See infra notes 76–79 and ac-
companying text. 
 28 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 135 (1995). 
 29 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt. c (2005); see also Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977) (recognizing that the right of publicity en-
courages creativity and economic incentives to individuals); Carson v. Here‘s Johnny Portable Toilets, 
Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (―Vindication of the right [of publicity] will also tend to prevent 
unjust enrichment by persons . . . who seek commercially to exploit the identity of celebrities without 
their consent). 
 31 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 
929–930 (2003) (although the right of publicity may be appealing, it creates too many First Amendment 
problems as to non-commercial speech). 
 32 See supra note 25; see also McCarthy, supra note 28, at 19 (noting that twenty-five states have 
recognized the right of publicity). 
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works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.‖33  Al-
though player names and statistics may be reported in various media, the 
athletes themselves do not have a claim for copyright protection because 
their ―identities‖ are not works that are fixed in a medium.34 
Federal trademark protection under the Lanham Act35 is also distin-
guishable.  The Lanham Act does recognize the marketable property rights 
in licensed merchandise and the value of brand recognition.36  It restricts 
the unauthorized commercial use, reproduction, imitation, or sale of a dis-
tinctive ―mark‖ or ―trade name‖ in connection with the sale of goods or 
services which is likely to cause consumer confusion or to deceive as to the 
origin, sponsorship or approval.37  Although team names and logos may 
qualify, trademarks generally cannot be used to protect a name identifying 
a particular living individual.38 
Defamation law is available to protect against false statements about a 
person that are injurious to the individual‘s reputation.39  Interestingly, 
well-known persons, such as celebrities or athletes, have a higher burden, 
as ―public figures,‖ to sustain a defamation action;40 yet, these same celebr-
ities have more name recognition value to prevail on publicity rights.  Tort 
false endorsement claims are distinct from publicity claims, which, by de-
finition, do not require proof of consumer confusion.  Publicity rights are a 
form of unfair competition and misappropriation law, which perhaps most 
closely track publicity rights, yet contain elements beyond the unauthorized 
commercial use of identity.41  Although the foregoing laws address distinct 
situations, courts noticeably conflate many of the considerations and fair 
use defenses recognized under statute in analyzing liability for a publicity 
rights violation.42 
 
 33 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).  Congress‘ authority to enact copyright laws is derived from the U.S. 
Constitution, article I, section 8 (providing Congress the power ―to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries . . . .‖). 
 34 See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846–47 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
claims that game statistics or athletic events were works of authorship within copyright protection, and 
stating, even if they were, ―no author may copyright facts or ideas.‖) (citation omitted). 
 35 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2000). 
 36 See RAY YASSER, JAMES R. MCCURDY, C. PETER GOPLERUD & MAUREEN A. WESTON, 
SPORTS LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 825 (6th ed. 2006). 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). 
 38 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2000). 
 39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (2000). 
 40 Id. at § 580A. 
Under current constitutional standards, however, in defamation actions the nature or status 
of the parties involved is a significant factor in determining the applicable legal standards.  
The test for liability in a defamation action depends on whether the libeled figure is a pub-
lic or private figure and on whether the defamatory publication addresses a matter of public 
or private concern. 
Margaret E. O‘Neill, Civil Liability for the Defamation of Persons, 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 
31 (2008); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
 41 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 5:48. 
 42 See infra Section III.A.2. 
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C. Examples of Cases Recognizing an Athlete‘s Right of Publicity 
In the sports and entertainment arenas, publicity rights have been rec-
ognized in a number of contexts.  Among these are: (1) a player‘s rights to 
preclude the use of his photograph on trading cards in a chewing gum 
packet;43 (2) the use of a look-alike in a commercial drawing which con-
tained characteristics of a popular athlete;44 and (3) imitations of a distinc-
tive voice.45 
The unauthorized use of a recognized name, nickname, or biographi-
cal information on unrelated commercial products has also been adjudged 
an illegal use of identity.46  In Uhlaender v. Henricksen,47 major league 
baseball players successfully enjoined the use of their names and statistical 
information contained in a baseball board game without royalties or a li-
cense agreement.48  The court held that the plaintiffs had a proprietary in-
terest in their names and sporting accomplishments sufficient to enable 
them to enjoy use thereof for commercial purposes.49  Professional golfers 
obtained a similar result regarding the unauthorized use of their names and 
statistics on a golfing board game.50  More recently, the Missouri Supreme 
Court ruled illegal the usage of the name of a professional hockey player as 
a character in a comic book.51 
In short, where an entity seeks to use a recognizable form of an ath-
lete‘s identity on an unrelated commercial product or service, it risks in-
fringing upon athlete publicity rights.  Whether these cases were correctly 
decided or whether a publicity right attaches when a name is used, arguably 
incidentally or in connection with other factual information such as player 
statistics, became central issues in C.B.C.  Where the rights of publicity es-
sentially can provide one person a monopoly over a name, do competing 
 
 43 See generally Haelan Labs., Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 44 Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (violation by unauthorized 
Playgirl representation of boxer, Muhammad Ali). 
 45 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving singer, Tom Waits‘ 
objections to the commercial use of his identity which he considered offensive to his musical integrity); 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (concerning singer in car commercial imitated 
Bette Midler‘s singing style and voice); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 
(9th Cir. 1992) (discussing Vanna White robot turning letters). 
 46 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391 (9th Cir. 1996) (using name 
―Lew Alcindor‖ in commercial aired during NCAA tournament); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 
280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (ruling that football players‘ publicity rights in ―Crazylegs‖ nickname 
precluded use of name on shaving cream product); Carson v. Here‘s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 
F.2d 831, 835–37 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 47 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). 
 48 Id. at 1282–83. 
 49 Id. at 1279, 1282 (distinguishing the right of publicity from privacy or misappropriation); see 
also Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (holding defen-
dant violated right of publicity with golf game); Shamksy v. Garan, 632 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1995) 
(holding that the sale of clothing/jerseys emblazoned with a group portrait of a legendary 1969 Mets 
MLB team, without the permission of the individual players, violated their right to publicity). 
 50 See Palmer, 232 A.2d at 458 (holding defendant use of golfers‘ names and statistics in connec-
tion with golfing board game violated publicity rights). 
 51 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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policies favoring public use and access preempt individual rights? 
D.  Defenses and Fair Use 
Claims of publicity rights violations fail where either the identity or 
commercial use elements are not established.52  Freedom of speech pro-
tected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution also limits en-
forcement of publicity rights.53  Nearly absolute Constitutional protection is 
accorded truthful speech, which is considered ―communicative.‖  By con-
trast, ―commercial‖ speech must yield to publicity rights.  The distinction is 
not always evident: 
A ―communicative‖ use is one in which the policy of free speech predominates 
over the right of a person to his identity, and no infringement of the right of pub-
licity takes place.  A ―commercial‖ use is one in which the right of publicity is 
infringed because, while there are overtones of ideas being communicated, the 
use is primarily commercial.54 
As Professor McCarthy notes, the medium used often determines the 
result, and, for example, ―[t]he unpermitted use of a person‘s identity on a 
product such as a coffee mug or a T-shirt will be ‗commercial‘ and require 
a license.‖  By contrast, using a person‘s identity or picture in a newspaper, 
magazine, or television news program is considered ‗communicative‘ and 
thus immune.55 
Examples of communicative speech entitled to broad First Amend-
ment protections include use of ―publicity rights‖ for newsworthy, political, 
artistic or creative purposes.  Thus, use of a celebrity‘s name for purposes 
of conveying news or use in artistic expressions, including biographies, is 
protected.  The artistic and creative use exception has immunized use of 
publicity rights.  For example, baseball cards that contained caricatures of 
prominent professional baseball players were considered within a form of 
free speech known as parody.  The court in Cardtoons56 thus held that pa-
rody trading cards ―are not commercial speech—they do not merely adver-
tise another unrelated product.‖57  Even Tiger Woods could not stop the 
sale of ―Masters of Augusta‖ prints in which artist Rick Rush depicted 
Woods on the greens at the famous tournament.58  A use that is transforma-
tive may also come within First Amendment purview.  Thus, Kirby v. Sega 
of America59 upheld the use of the plaintiff‘s likeness where the video game 
 
 52 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. 
Supp. 2d 1077, 1088-1089 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 53 U.S. CONST. amend I.; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 3:1. 
 54 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:4 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 57 Id. at 970. 
 58 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ‘g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that First Amendment 
protections for artistic and creative use outweighed famous golfer‘s publicity rights). 
 59 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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character that used a celebrity‘s likeness was transformative.60 
Courts have ruled the use of facts or information about a person, 
which are considered in ―the public domain,‖ ―historical facts,‖ or ―in the 
public interest‖ as within First Amendment protection.61  These courts have 
not adequately explained, however, whether information that is reported in 
the news can be then exploited for commercial use and stay within the 
communicative exception because it was obtained from the news.  For ex-
ample, when historical facts constitute a person‘s ―identity,‖ is subsequent 
commercial use unfettered? 
Similarly, the justification for permitting the use of publicity rights 
under a ―public interest‖ exception is dubious.  Particularly if publicity 
rights are based in property, a claim of a ―public interest‖ exception can 
seemingly swallow the rule.62  Much of the public may be interested in a 
host of private or proprietary information, yet this appetite should not nec-
essarily convert to a right to free commercial use or to deprive a holder of 
intellectual property rights.  Significantly, the commercial use of identity 
sets the right of publicity apart from the newsworthy and creative commu-
nicative free use principles protected under the First Amendment. 
II.  THE USE OF ATHLETE IDENTITIES IN FANTASY SPORTS: 
FAIR USE OR UNFAIR APPROPRIATION? 
A. Fantasy Sports‘ Challenge to Player Publicity Rights 
Developments in technology, such as through the Internet, video 
games, CD-ROMs, online information, fantasy sports, and interactive 
games, present opportunities for emerging and lucrative markets for sports-
themed products.  Although fantasy sports is not a new concept, the inter-
net‘s broad proliferation and accessibility have made fantasy sports into a 
multi-million dollar industry.63  Inherent in these uses are expectations for 
rampant access to and use of player identities.  Fantasy sports‘ assertion of 
free use of player identities in C.B.C. posed the challenge of identifying the 
boundaries or effective regulation for player publicity rights in new media. 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 
2d 1077, 1092 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 62 Dean Erwin Chemerinksy has criticized the vagueness of the ―public interest‖ exception as 
within the First Amendment and proposed that only truthful speech that poses safety threat should be 
actionable.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Truthful Speech: Narrowing the Tort of Public Disclo-
sure of Private Facts, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 423, 423 (2008). 
 63 Formerly relying on newspapers and weekly compilations of statistics, Karcher notes that: 
The advent of the Internet transformed the fantasy league industry from one of ‗mom and 
pop‘ into a commercial enterprise, and provided every fantasy league with up-to-the-
minute updates of all player statistics.  The increased efficiencies brought millions of new 
participants along with it, as well as new fantasy league operators to capitalize. 
Karcher, supra note 20, at 561–62. 
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1. Case Background 
C.B.C. is a Missouri corporation that offers fantasy sports products 
and games over the internet to its paying users.64  C.B.C.‘s website, 
www.CDMsports.com, allows its users to fashion their own fantasy teams 
to play in online leagues.65  Users act as team owners, participating in a 
draft and later trading fantasy players, if they like.  The success of a user‘s 
fantasy teams corresponds to the chosen players‘ actual performances.  The 
website uses the names and current statistics of actual Major League Base-
ball (―MLB‖) players and also employs journalists to write interest stories, 
including player profiles and reports for its users to read.66  The C.B.C. 
website contains current and actual statistics of the MLB players.  These 
statistics include ―box score‖ information, such as players‘ ―batting aver-
ages, at bats, hits, runs, doubles, triples, home runs, etc.‖67 
From 1995 until 2004, C.B.C. had a licensing agreement with the Ma-
jor League Baseball Players‘ Association (―MLBPA‖), granting C.B.C. the 
rights to use ―the names, nicknames, likenesses, signatures, pictures, play-
ing records, and/or biographical data of each player,‖ identified as the 
‗Player‘s Rights‘ on C.B.C. website.68  The Agreement also included a ―no-
challenge‖ provision, which provided, inter alia, that C.B.C. refrain from 
using the Player Rights upon termination of the Agreement.69 
In 2000, MLB team owners formed Advanced Media to act as the ―in-
teractive media and internet arm of Major League Baseball‖ and to operate 
MLB.com.70  In 2005, Advanced Media entered into a licensing agreement 
with the MLBPA, giving Advanced Media exclusive authority to negotiate 
and sub-license rights of the players in conjunction with interactive me-
dia.71  Thereafter, Advanced Media refused to extend C.B.C.‘s license.  In 
response, C.B.C. filed a preemptive suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief to enjoin Advanced Media from any interference it may have in 
C.B.C.‘s interactive industry.72  Advanced Media counterclaimed, alleging 
breach of contract and challenging C.B.C.‘s use of player names and statis-
tics as a violation of the players‘ publicity rights.73 
 
 64 C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.  C.B.C. uses the trade name, CDM Fantasy Sports.  Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 1080-81. 
 69 Id. at 1081. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Brandon T. Moonier, Comment, The Legal Game Behind Fantasy Sports: Copyright Protec-
tion and the Right of Publicity in Professional Performance Statistics, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
129, 130 (2007) (commenting that the effect of this was to narrow the market for fantasy games to a 
handful of websites with licensing agreements). 
 72 See C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. 
 73 Id. at 1082.  Advanced Media‘s allegation of violation of the right of publicity was based on 
CBC‘s use of ―names, nicknames, likenesses, signatures, jersey numbers, pictures, playing records and 
biographical data . . . .‖  Id. 
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2. The District Court Holds no Identity, no Commercial Use, and no 
Injury 
The district court first examined whether the players had a right of 
publicity in their names and statistics as used by C.B.C.74  The court re-
jected the Players‘ claim that fantasy baseball‘s use of name and statistical 
data involved players‘ character, personality, reputation, physical appear-
ance, or other factors shaping identity.75  The court concluded that the iden-
tity element was absent, stating that the manner in which a players‘ name 
was used mattered, not just the fact that it was used.76  Here, the court de-
termined that C.B.C.‘s use ―simply involv[ed] historical facts about the 
baseball players such as their batting averages, home runs, doubles, triples, 
etc.‖77 
The district court also held that C.B.C. did not appropriate names of 
players for its commercial advantage.78  The court stated that the use of 
names and associated statistical records was in conjunction with the play-
ing of games, rather than for independent benefit to be derived from names 
and statistics.79  It stated that C.B.C.‘s use did not imply players‘ endorse-
ment of C.B.C.‘s games, assessing commercial use by whether ―a defen-
dant intended to create an impression that a plaintiff is associated with the 
defendant‘s product . . . .‖80  Use had to be more than merely incidental.81  
The court declared that the evidence did not suggest player association or 
endorsement of C.B.C. fantasy games or that the players‘ names and statis-
tics were used with an intention to draw customers from other fantasy web-
sites, as all the websites use the same statistics.82  It distinguished the use of 
the players‘ names and statistics from a situation where a person‘s likeness 
was used to convey endorsement of a product, noting that the claim focused 
on use of the players‘ names, not their pictures.83 
 
 74 Id. at 1084–85 (reiterating the elements of a right of publicity claim as set forth in Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), that ―(1) [the] defendant used plaintiff‘s name 
as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and with the intent to obtain a commercial advan-
tage.‖). 
 75 Id. at 1089. 
 76 Id.  To determine commercial use, the court considered ―the nature and extent of the identify-
ing characteristics used by the defendant, the defendant‘s intent, the fame of the plaintiff, evidence of 
actual identification made by third persons, and surveys or other evidence indicating the perceptions of 
the audience.‖  Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 1088. 
 79 Id. at 1085. 
 80 Id. (citing Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 371 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)). 
 81 Id. at 1085 n.9. 
 82 Id. at 1086.  ―Using a plaintiff‘s name ‗to attract attention to [a] product‘ is evidence support-
ing a conclusion that a defendant sought to obtain a commercial advantage.‖  Id. at 1085. 
 83 Id. at 1086–87.  The court responded to Advanced Media‘s attempt to analogize the present 
case to Palmer where the commercial element was satisfied, when golfer Arnold Palmer‘s picture, 
name and playing records appeared in a board game made by Schonhorn Enterprises.  Palmer v. 
Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 1967).  In comparing the two cases the court 
remarked: ―Unlike cases where there was an appropriation of a likeness to create the impression that a 
famous person endorsed a product, C.B.C.‘s use of players‘ names in no way creates an impression that 
players endorse CBC‘s fantasy games.‖  C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.  The court suggested that 
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The district court also denied the players‘ claim of injury.  According 
to the court, C.B.C.‘s use did not pose any real damage to the players‘ val-
ue in their identities and the use did not ―go to the heart of the players‘ abil-
ity to earn a living as baseball players.‖84  The court also deemed the statis-
tics as part of the public domain and offered that the existence of fantasy 
games perhaps made actual games more lucrative and enhanced a players‘ 
marketability and the popularity of baseball as a sport.85 
Despite finding no right of player publicity, the court continued in ca-
tegorizing the players‘ names and statistics as factual data and historical 
facts, akin to ―bits of baseball‘s history,‖ and declaring C.B.C.‘s use pro-
tected under the First Amendment.86 The court acknowledged that C.B.C. 
may profit in its use of the player names and statistics.  Yet, the court de-
clined to rule that this use constituted commercial speech.87  In a footnote, 
the court acknowledged the Missouri Supreme Court‘s statement that ―the 
use of a persons’s [sic] identity for purely commercial purposes, like adver-
tising goods or services or the use of a person‘s name or likeness on mer-
chandise, is rarely protected.‖88  In what appeared to be analogous 
precedent, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did 
not protect a comic book publisher‘s unauthorized use of a former athlete‘s 
name and identity.89  The district court avoided TCI by treating C.B.C.‘s 
use of player names and statistics as a form of interactive expression and 
which had entertainment value, noting that ―entertainment itself can be im-
portant news,‖ and thus within First Amendment protection.90 
The court ruled that the First Amendment rights to expression and the 
public‘s interest in fantasy sports outweighed the players‘ publicity rights.91  
It found that C.B.C.‘s use serves an important public interest by informing 
and entertaining the public about the history of baseball.  The court distin-
guished between cases considering the economic value of a person‘s identi-
ty from cases where the issue centers on the value of the performance, find-
ing the latter more compelling and inapplicable to C.B.C.‘s use.92 
As to the Players‘ breach of contract claim, the court ruled the no-use 
and no-challenge provisions of the parties‘ prior agreement was unenforce-
 
Palmer itself may be outdated.  Id. 
 84 Id. at 1091. 
 85 Id.  The court further noted that it is the players‘ skill and not the resulting statistics that sup-
port the player‘s livelihood.  Id. 
 86 Id. at 1092. 
 87 Id. at 1093 (noting that merely because a product is sold for profit does not automatically mean 
that commercial speech is present). 
 88 Id. at 1094 (citing Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)). 
 89 TCI, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
 90 C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S 562, 
578 (1977)). 
 91 Id. at 1095–99 (―After balancing the interests at issue regarding CBC‘s First Amendment right 
to freedom of expression and those involved in the players‘ claimed right of publicity the court 
finds . . . that CBC‘s First Amendment right to freedom of expression prevails over the player‘s claimed 
right of publicity.‖). 
 92 Id. at 1098. 
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able due to public policy concerns.93  The court concluded that the theory 
of licensee estoppel (where a licensee is estopped from questioning the va-
lidity of its license) and contract principles collapsed when balanced 
against a ―strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the 
public domain.‖94  Thus, the no-challenge contractual provision was inef-
fective in prohibiting C.B.C. from using player names and statistics, which 
the court held to be within the public domain. 
3. The Eighth Circuit Acknowledges Publicity Rights but Holds that 
the First Amendment Trumps 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s decision in favor of 
C.B.C.‘s use of the players‘ names and statistics, but on different grounds.  
Unlike the lower court, the circuit court acknowledged that the Players sa-
tisfied all three elements of a right of publicity.95  First, the statistics had 
been used without consent.96  Secondly, the court recognized that a name 
alone could be sufficient to establish identity.  As here, the names used 
were identifiable by C.B.C.‘s target audience as representing Major League 
baseball players.97  This was more than ―mere use‖ of a name and sufficient 
to establish a symbol of their identity.98  The court also ruled that the com-
mercial advantage element was satisfied.99  The court correctly noted that 
the plaintiff does not have to show that users felt any endorsement was in-
tended.  Rather, Missouri law looks to a defendant‘s intent to gain a profit 
from the use of the identity.100  Thus, the court found that C.B.C. was using 
the names and statistics commercially.101 
Although the appeals court reversed the lower court in finding a viola-
tion of the right of publicity, it upheld the ruling that the publicity claims 
must yield under the First Amendment.  The court regarded C.B.C.‘s use of 
player names and statistics as a form of speech, which has entertainment 
value but also informs, within public domain.102  It stated that restricting 
such use would amount to incongruous law.103 
The appeals court also invoked the theme (of dubious legal signific-
ance) that a certain reverence has been given to baseball as the ―national 
 
 93 Id. at 1106–07. 
 94 Id. at 1104. 
 95 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 
822–23 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 96 Id. at 822. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. (following the standard under the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 
cmt. a, b, (2005) and Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 371 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), where the 
commercial advantage element can be found ―in connection with services rendered by the user.‖). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 823. 
 102 Id. (noting that―[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the pro-
tection of that basic right.‘‖) (quoting Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n, 95 F.3d 
959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 103 Id. (stating ―[i]t would be strange law . . . .‖). 
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pastime,‖ making the public interest in its players and statistics very in-
tense.104  Like the district court, the Eighth Circuit viewed publicity rights 
as implicating economic rights, rather than privacy or intellectual property 
issues.105  It assumed that the players‘ monetary interests are protected, as 
the players can still earn a good living, and that no single player is viewed 
as endorsing a particular fantasy sports league, since the entire team is in-
cluded in the league.106 
The court affirmed the dismissal of the players‘ contract and licensee 
estoppel claims, but, again, on different grounds.  The court focused on a 
warranty of title that was present in the contract that held out the Players‘ 
Association as the sole owner and holder of all the players‘ publicity 
rights.107  The court noted that C.B.C. relied on the warranty and consi-
dered it a material breach as the rights were found not to be under the sole 
control of the Players‘ Association.108 
B. Analyzing C.B.C.: Did the Eighth Circuit Get it Right? 
In Zacchini, the Supreme Court declared that state law rights of pub-
licity should be balanced against the First Amendment and its policies.109  
Yet, did the Eighth Circuit correctly articulate the basis for First Amend-
ment application to trump what it conceded were player publicity rights?  If 
the fantasy sports were a board game and not an online, interactive game, 
would the results be the same?  What are the parameters for the use of pub-
licity rights violations in digital media? 
The C.B.C. ruling is incongruous with cases such as Uhlaender v. He-
nricksen,110 where the use of players‘ names, numbers and statistical infor-
mation in board games constituted a violation of publicity rights.111  While 
the district court in C.B.C. considered the Uhlaender decision an archaic 
form of publicity rights law and, thus, not controlling, the district court of-
fered no specific reasons why Uhlaender should be discounted.112  Al-
though the medium used to display the names and statistics differed, it is 
unclear why the results in the respective cases disconnect.  Even if Uh-
laender is outdated, later cases similarly recognized publicity rights in the 
unauthorized use of names or voice over claims of First Amendment privi-
lege.113  As Professor Karcher notes: 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 824. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 824–25. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S 562, 567–68 (1977). 
 110 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970). 
 111 See id. at 1282. 
 112 See Karcher, supra note 20, at 569 (surmising that both Uhlaendar and Palmer are consistent 
with the Supreme Court in Zacchini, suggesting there was no reason for the court to find either incon-
sistent in C.B.C.). 
 113 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding for singer Tom 
Waits after Frito Lay used a song based around a Waits classic paired with a singer meant to sound sim-
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[I]f players do not have a right of publicity in their names and performance statis-
tics used by fantasy league operators, then how is it that players do have a right 
of publicity when their identities are used in trading cards and electronic video 
games, in which producers currently pay a premium in order to use the players‘ 
names and likenesses?114 
Does the public fascination with sports warrant that athlete publicity 
rights are distinct from other celebrities?  Courts have cited, oddly, the tra-
dition and pervasive nature of sports in our society as a basis for differen-
tial legal treatment.115  In C.B.C., both the lower and appellate court seemed 
to view baseball players differently from individual public figures, regard-
ing baseball as an inviolable tradition, which the players are bound to hon-
or.116  The Eighth Circuit‘s opinion carries over the district court‘s judg-
ment that the players are adequately compensated and that C.B.C. should 
be allowed in the game by using player names and statistics that are re-
ported in the news anyway.117  The court‘s ruling negates its conclusion 
that the players‘ right to earn is unaffected by its decision as the result lim-
its the right for players‘ to profit from their efforts.118  A determination that 
 
ilar to Waits); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding violation of sing-
er/actress Bette Midler‘s publicity rights after a car commercial included a voiceover using a Midler 
impersonator); Carson v. Here‘s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (violation 
of entertainer Carson‘s publicity rights found by use of the tag line ―Here‘s Johnny‖); Hirsch v. S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 140 (Wis. 1979) (finding an issue of triable fact based upon the 
use by S.C. Johnson of the name ―Crazylegs,‖ which was synonymous with former football player 
Elroy Hirsch). 
 114 Karcher, supra note 20, at 570. 
 115 See, e.g., Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (Ct. App. 2001), reh’g 
denied, (Cal. 2002) (rejecting former ballplayers‘ claim that defendants violated their rights of publicity 
by disseminating factual data concerning the players, including  performance statistics, photographs, 
and verbal descriptions and video depictions of their play without permission or compensation, stating 
that ―[g]iven the pervasive influence of baseball on our culture, the uses at issue came within the ‗public 
affairs‘ uses exempt from consent . . . .‖); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (affirming the 
judicially created exemption from antitrust laws for baseball); Fed. Baseball v. Nat‘l League of Prof‘l 
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 260 (1922). 
 116 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 
818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing baseball as the ―nation‘s pastime‖ and noting that baseball players are 
already rewarded well for their effort). 
 117  
Other motives for creating a publicity right are the desire to provide incentives to encour-
age a person's productive activities and to protect consumers from misleading advertising.  
But major league baseball players are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participa-
tion in games and can earn additional large sums from endorsements and sponsorship ar-
rangements. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 118 See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 
F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097–98 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Michael Ma-
dow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 
210 (1993)).  The district court suggested the salaries of players as being bloated and that economic 
inducement to play should not be as strong of a motivating factor.  It stated that: 
Such figures suggest that ―even without the right of publicity the rate of return to stardom 
in the entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth a more than 
‗adequate‘ supply of creative effort and achievement.‖ . . . The extra income generated by 
licensing one's identity does not provide a necessary inducement to enter and achieve in the 
realm of sports and entertainment.  Thus, while publicity rights may provide some incen-
WESTON 11/10/2008 3:22 PM 
596 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:581 
players earn enough through their salaries should not excuse an unautho-
rized commercial use.  The growth of the fantasy sports industry and its 
profitability may reveal a large disparity between profits and player salaries 
or endorsement opportunities.119 
Notably, the C.B.C. court does not examine the case under the rubric 
of emerging media, such as the Internet.  While the court critiques other 
decisions in the area of publicity rights law as outdated, it fails to take any 
substantial step forward by directly addressing the use of digital media.  
Perhaps the decision is consistent with a policy favoring innovation and 
free access for use on the Internet.  Fantasy sports have become a profitable 
industry by virtue of the availability and efficiency of the Internet.  This 
medium, where the expectation of free content is particularly acute, has 
proven far more difficult to regulate than static, tangible entities, such as 
magazines and board games. 
The C.B.C. court asserts that ―[t]he information used in C.B.C.‘s fan-
tasy baseball games is all readily available in the public domain, and it 
would be strange law that a person would not have a first amendment right 
to use information that is available to everyone.‖120  This conclusion seems 
to overlook the different ways in which information can be used.  For in-
stance, a newspaper which includes box scores as a small segment of the 
material it covers that day is significantly different from a website whose 
basic purpose and function are dependent upon the information.121 
The court deems the player statistics as ―historical facts‖ in the ―public 
domain.‖  Yet, statistics do not remain fixed.  They fluctuate each season 
and can change dramatically due to outside factors or unforeseen circums-
tances such as injuries.  The district court argued that it is the players‘ ac-
tions on the field and skill level that make them profitable, not their statis-
tics.122  But statistics are a direct interpretation of a player‘s skill.  A 
symbiotic relationship exists between the players and their statistics, as the 
 
tive for creativity and achievement, the magnitude and importance of that incentive has 
been exaggerated. 
Id. 
 119 Middle level players without the large endorsement deals can be most affected by such a deci-
sion because another avenue of profit from their efforts is closed. 
 120 C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823.  The NBA encountered a similar argument when it sought to prevent 
Motorola from transmitting real time game information on handheld pagers.  The Court held that the 
Motorola service provided ―purely factual information which any patron of an NBA game could acquire 
from the arena without any involvement from . . . others who contribute to the originality of a broad-
cast.‖  Nat‘l. Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846–47 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Nat‘l 
Basketball Ass‘n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996)).  The court rejected claims that game statistics or athletic events were within copyright protec-
tion and stated that ―[n]o author may copyright facts or ideas.‖  Id. (quoting Harper Row, Publ‘rs,  Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)). 
 121 C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (the district court noted that deprivation of the right to use 
would mean that ―CBC would be unable to create and operate its fantasy games as the games cannot 
operate without the players‘ names and playing records.‖) (emphasis added). 
 122 See id. at 1089 (use of the player‘s name and their record ―does not involve the character, per-
sonality, reputation or physical appearance of the players.‖). 
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statistics are largely worth nothing without the associated player.  A play-
er‘s worth also diminishes if his statistics drop.  Having a unique statistic 
can also make a player more identifiable and profitable.  Baseball cards 
provide an example, as collectors are more likely to purchase one of a 
player who has excelled throughout their career or who has a unique statis-
tic such as stolen bases over a season.  Fans closely follow game statistics 
and the results change each season.  Without statistics and player names, 
fantasy sports have no product. 
III.  C.B.C.‘S IMPACT ON ATHLETE PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN FANTASY 
SPORTS AND OTHER NEW MEDIA 
A. The Future of Fantasy Sports 
What is the impact of C.B.C. on fantasy sports and other commercial 
uses of athlete identities?  Viewed narrowly, the case merely holds that 
player names and statistics are in the public domain and may be used com-
mercially without licensure from the players.  Yet the magnitude of its im-
pact is soon tested.123  Perhaps the case can be confined to its facts.  Pre-
sumably, fantasy sports providers want to use more than player names and 
statistics, and licensure is still required to use player photographs.  But if a 
name and statistics constitute ―identity‖ that can be used, why are other im-
ages different?  Does C.B.C. suggest a re-examination of the ―trading 
cards‖ law, and the necessity for licenses for videos, electronic or board 
games?124 
Fantasy sports is a multi-million dollar industry and covers virtually 
all professional and many college sports.  Presumably, the gaming industry 
will be looking to C.B.C. as a green light.  The C.B.C. decision potentially 
enables expansion of the industry, de-licensing, and an inevitable impact on 
licensing revenues.125 
B. C.B.C.‘s Potential Impact 
The C.B.C. decision presents complicated practical and policy con-
cerns for media providers, users, and those who wish to have a remaining 
stake in their publicity rights. 
 
 123 C.B.C., 505 F.3d 818. 
 124  
[I]n rejecting the players‘ claim that fantasy sports infringe their rights, [C.B.C.] abandons 
prior approaches to the right of publicity and creates its own . . . . If the decision is upheld, 
the effects could be widespread and overreaching.  It has the potential to influence all 
sports-related products, including video games, memorabilia, and other merchandise, as the 
court‘s opinion does not resolve what portions of the athletes‘ identities remain protected 
from appropriation. 
Gabriel Grossman, Comment, Switch Hitting: How CBC v. MLB Advanced Media Redefined the Right 
of Publicity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 285, 286, 313 (2007). 
 125 Michael McCarthy, Fantasy Sports Ruling Could Have Wide Impact, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/fantasy/2007-10-16-fantasy-ruling_N.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) 
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1. Proliferating Markets and Uses 
With the elimination of a licensing fee, the fantasy sports industry is 
likely to expand.126  In light of C.B.C., larger fantasy sports outlets such as 
ESPN are seeking to renegotiate their licensing deals.127  Other providers 
and media outlets may follow a similar course in seeking lower licensing 
fees without the barrier of publicity rights.  Fantasy sports providers are al-
so considering ways to branch out and merge with other media, such as 
through mobile content extensions of the games that allow users to access 
updated statistics on players via cell phones.128  Another use is by connect-
ing fantasy sports teams to video games such as the Madden series, allow-
ing users to insert their fantasy teams into the Madden setting.129 
2. Limits on Player Compensation and Reputational Controls 
The right to control use of one‘s identity and to protect one‘s reputa-
tion is the policy interest supporting the right to restrict what otherwise 
seems like free speech.  Under C.B.C., players‘ ability to earn income 
through licensing their names and statistics in this medium, as well as to 
control use of their names, is impaired.  Further, without the protection of 
publicity rights, players may become, unknowing and unwillingly, linked 
to undesirable media or uses.  While the C.B.C. courts note that no en-
dorsement is suggested by the use of player name and statistics in fantasy 
sports websites,130 this provides little comfort to a player who finds himself 
connected to objectionable media or uses.131  An example would be the 
possible expansion into fantasy sports gambling.  Websites such as Pro-
trade132 and DraftMix133 allow users to bet fake money on the sports stock 
market and trade in their stock for prizes.134  However, DraftMix is consi-
 
 126 Marc Edelman, Sports and the Law: Could Yahoo Sale Kill Free Fantasy Sports?, 
ABOVETHELAW.COM, Feb. 8, 2008, www.abovethelaw.com/2008/02/sports and_the_law_could_ 
yahoo.php (noting that currently Yahoo Sports, CBS Sports and ESPN hold much of the market for fan-
tasy gaming). 
 127 John Ourand & Eric Fisher, ESPN Seeks Better MLBAM Terms, STREET & SMITH‘S SPORTS 
BUS. J., Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=article.main& 
articleId=57807 (ESPN‘s 2005 digital rights agreement with Advanced Media includes an opt-out 
clause that ESPN is attempting to apply to reduce its payments.  The agreement is a seven-year deal 
currently worth $20 million a year). 
 128 Karcher, supra note 20, at 563 (noting Mforma‘s deal with CBS Sportsline and the additional 
charge Yahoo Sports applies for users who want mobile access to fantasy data). 
 129 Id. 
 130 See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
 131  
The CBC court‘s definition of commercial advantage, which requires an association ele-
ment of endorsement or advertisement, sets a dangerous precedent because, presumably, 
the players would not be able to prevent the use of their identities in the operation of such 
an enterprise.  The players would be left without recourse because they would not be able 
to establish a violation of the right of privacy on the grounds of ‗embarrassment. 
Karcher, supra note 20, at 572. 
 132 Pro Trade, http://www.protrade.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 133 DraftMix, http://www.draftmix.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 134 Nick Gonzalez, DraftMix: Faster Fantasy Sports For Fun Or Profit, Nov. 5, 2007, 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/11/05/draftmix-faster-fantasy-sports-for-fun-or-profit/. 
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dering allowing users to apply real money to its sports stock market.135  For 
some, gambling in any form carries a moral stigma.  Without the right to 
withhold the use of their name and statistics, players may feel their reputa-
tions exploited or compromised.  A branching out into gambling may harm 
the fantasy sports industry. 
Fantasy sports are exempt from the Unlawful Internet Gambling En-
forcement Act of 2006.136  A traditional definition of what constitutes gam-
bling is whether a game of skill or a game of chance is being pursued, with 
the latter considered out of the boundaries of legality in many states.137  
One such claim that fantasy sports was akin to gambling was raised and de-
feated in Humphrey v. Viacom.138  But shifts in uses may trigger new 
claims that the legality of online sports gaming be reconsidered. 
C. C.B.C.‘s Impact on New Uses and Emerging Issues in New Media 
The tension between melding publicity rights law and new media has 
caused conflict beyond the fantasy sports sphere.  The present fascination 
with YouTube139 provides an example.  YouTube is a web-based video 
hosting service that allows its users free of charge to upload and tag videos 
for sharing, as well as watch video clips posted by other users.140  The web-
site‘s popularity has skyrocketed since its creation in 2005.141  YouTube‘s 
relaxed internal regulation of its user-posted videos has left it vulnerable to 
litigation, as some of the videos infringe on existing copyrights.  The web-
site does self-policing by having YouTube employees sift through the vid-
eos using search terms that users input as well as relying on users to report 
objectionable materials.142  When one of these terms leads to copyrighted 
material, the video is removed.143  With this system, there can be a large 
gap in the time frame between the posting of the copyrighted material and 
its removal.  YouTube has been compliant with removal requests by copy-
right holders, but the material is still viewed at some point before removal. 
Beyond the copyright issues YouTube presents, publicity rights of ath-
letes and other public figures are also vulnerable.  For example, in 2006, 
 
 135 See id. 
 136 31 U.S.C. §§ 5365, 5366 (2000). 
 137 Id. 
 138 No. 060-2768 (DMC), slip op., 2007 WL 1797648 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (plaintiff filed suit 
against fantasy sports providers owned by Viacom alleging that the pay-to-play games were illegal 
gambling).  The case was dismissed. 
 139 See YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 140 Jason C. Breen, YouTube Or You Lose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Law-
suit?, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 151, 155–56 (2007). 
 141 Eugene C. Kim, Note, YouTube: Testing the Safe Harbors of Digital Copyright Law, 17 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 139, 139–40 (2007) (noting that, in July of 2006, more than sixty-three million 
people visited the site and, by January 2007, it controlled a 43.3% share of the online video market, 
ranking twelfth overall in domain traffic). 
 142 Amy R. Mellow, Note, . . . And The Ruling On The Field Is Fair: A Fair Use Analysis of Up-
loading NFL Videos Onto YouTube And Why The NFL Should License Its Material To The Website, 17 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 173, 179 (2007). 
 143 Id. at 179. 
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the NFL demanded that YouTube remove three thousand game clips that 
were posted on the website.144  Other entities have made similar requests as 
well as instituted litigation, alleging copyright infringement.145  In defense, 
YouTube notes that clips appearing on the website are kept to a maximum 
of ten minutes.146  Since protection for filmed sporting events is based 
around the arrangement of camera angles and shots in a game, one could 
argue that a clip of a particular play is not a violation of any copyright or 
publicity claim.147  The struggle to regulate developing media continues 
and much of the suggested regulations fall short of the task.148 
CONCLUSION 
The contours of First Amendment protection are not as cleanly deli-
neated as the simple elements needed to establish a right of publicity 
claim—that of identifiability and unauthorized commercial use.  Although 
fantasy sports are clearly using athlete identities commercially, C.B.C. in-
vokes the First Amendment on an intuitive basis, reasoning that, because 
the box scores are free, everyone should be able to use them however de-
sired.  But, even if the press has rights to use this information for news pur-
poses, this does not mean that this information can be used for unlicensed 
entrepreneurial use.149 
Perhaps the decision, while dubious under a legal analytical rubric, is 
correct simply as a practical matter.  Perhaps the right of publicity goes too 
far in giving athletes power to foreclose use of proprietary information that 
the public finds interesting and wants to use for free.  But if so, the necessi-
ty of such right should be reevaluated, abolished, or at a minimum, the con-
tours of its reach clearly delineated.  Meanwhile, reliance on a  ―national 
pastime‖ exemption, the desire to ―keep laws off baseball,‖ or ad hoc rul-
ings that deem public interest to outweigh a right recognized as property do 
not provide the standard of certainty that fair play requires. The fascination 
with sports, athletes, and new technology does not constitute an entitlement 
or exception to current law according individuals rights to control use of 
their identities and publicity. 
 
 144 Id. at 174. 
 145 See, e.g., Viacom Int‘l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103, slip op., 2008 WL 629951 
(S.D.N.Y.  Mar. 7, 2008); Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV 06-4436 FMC (AJWx), 2007 WL 4947612  
(C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007). 
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implementation on online payment processors such as banks to inspect transactions.  The act offers little 
government assistance and no initiative for the processors to carry out the regulations.  See Letter from 
iMEGA to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Dec. 12, 
2007) available at http://www.imega.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/imega-comments-on-fed-do-
1298-and-treas-do-2007-0015-12-12-07.pdf. 
 149 See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 366 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
